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Abstract-Probabilistic induction allows us to conclude that the probability of a hypothesis being 
true increases when evidences in favor of the hypothesis occur. A claim made by Karl Popper and 
David Miller that probabilistic induction is impossible is shown to be untenable, using an example. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to clarify certain issues raised by K. Popper and D. Miller on 
inductive probability [l] d an controvert their assertion about the “the impossibility of inductive 
probability.” In the sequel it is shown that probabilistic induction is possible, at least in some 
special cases. See [2] for further reservations regarding the Popper-Miller assertion. We make 
our notations and definitions clear before we proceed further. As far as possible, the notations 
in [l] have been used. 
A proposition h whose truth we want to investigate, we call a hypothesis. A proposition e 
such that h =+ e is true, we call an evidence of h. If the evidence e is such that it is also true 
that e + h, then we call it a confirmation of h. Assuming that we have a probabilistic system, we 
can investigate the probability of the proposition e =+ h being true, where e is an evidence of h. 
We call this probability p(e + h), the credibility of the evidence e. We want to show that the 
credibility increases when the evidences pile up. In the following, we assume S1 to be the initial 
system, and every time an evidence occurs, we consider the resulting system as a new system. 
Further, we will assume that at no time a counterevidence turns up. Thus, we have evidences 
turning up continuously and the series of systems designated as S,. A fact we can reasonably 
assume is that if the hypothesis is not true, the probability of an evidence turning up remains 
stationary and does not depend on the previous evidence. Thus, 
p(e, I K-J = den+1 I %+I). (1) 
Figure 1. System S. 
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To firm up the terminology, consider the example of a freak coin with heads on both sides. The 
problem is to decide whether a given coin is freak or not by tossing it and observing the outcome. 
Here the hypothesis h is that the coin is freak. The evidence e is that a head has turned up. It is 
quite obvious that the probability of the coin being freak increases continuously if the heads are 
turning up every time. 
In the Venn diagram shown in Figure 1, the innermost circle represents the event h, the 
outermost circle represents the universal event and the middle circle represents the event e. The 
outer annular region represents the event B and the inner annular region e& as marked. We will 
attach subscripts to these symbols when they refer to a particular system. Thus for the system S, 
we write p(h,) = a,, p(e,L) = b,, p(G) = cn. 
2. PROBABILISTIC INDUCTION 
THEOREM. a, monotonically increases, while b, and c, monotonically decrease with n. Further, 
lim a, = 1, lim b, = 0, 
12-00 TZ-C0 
lim c, = 0. 
71-00 
Also, 
lim p(e, + h,) = 1, 
71+cCJ 
i.e., the credibility of the evidence increases when evidences turn up and finally the evidence 
becomes a confirmation. 
PROOF. To avoid pathological conditions, we assume that al, bl, and cl are positive. Since 
p(hn+l) is by definition equal to p(h, 1 e,), we can use Figure 1 to write, 
p(hn4 p(h) an 
a,+1 =p(h+l) =P(& I en) = ~(e = - = -. 
n den) a, + bn 
Using (l), 
and 
%+’ = (a,? bn) (bn?cn)’ 
From (3) and (4), 
Using (2) to (5), 
b, bl - = -. 
c, Cl 
(5) 
b n+~ = (I- a,+,,$&- = 
bl 
(1 - a,+l)- 
n ?I bl + CI ’ 
%+I = (I- a,+lJC, 
Cl 
b, +cn 
= (1 - a,+l)-. 
bl + cl 
(6) 
(7) 
These equations show that a, monotonically increases, and b, and c, monotonically decrease. 
Since a, cannot be greater than one, it must have a limit as n tends to infinity. In other words, 
lim *=l. 
n--rm a,+1 
Using (2), 
lim (a, + bn) = lim -?!L = 1, 12-00 n-03 a,+1 
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Sincea,+b,+c,=l, 
lim c, = 0. (8) 71-00 
Using (5) and (8), 
lim b, = $Fac, = 0. (9) n+ca 
Since both b, and c, tend to zero, 
lim a,=l. 
7X-t00 
Since b, decreases monotonically and (e, + h,) = (a, V h,), by definition, it is clear that 
p(e, =+ h,) = p(E, v h,) = 1 - b, increases monotonically. From (9) it immediately follows that 
lim p(e, * hn) = 1. 
n-too 
Note that we have used only the axioms of elementary probability theory, and this can be easily 
verified by working out in detail the example of the freak coin mentioned earlier. Finally, it 
should be stated that the following fact is of crucial significance for removing the confusion in 
Popper-Miller argument [l]: While it is true that p([er + hr] ] er) = p(hr 1 er) = p(hs) = CLZ, we 
must recognise that p([er + hr] ] er ) is not the same as p( [ez + hz] 1 er) = p(ez + hs) = a2 + c2. 
Further, it is easy to see from (2) that in the pathological case when al = 0, a, does not increase 
monotonically with n. This may also be another possible reason for the confusion in [l]. 
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